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UNFAIR DISMISSAL: EMERGING ISSUES IN
THE USE OF ARBITRATION AS A DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVE FOR THE
NONUNION WORKFORCE
Eva Robins*
I. Introduction
Employment or termination at-will has been the recognized con-
cept of employment in our history.' Certain types of employees, how-
ever, have been protected from the possibility of termination at-will,
without cause. Among these are those whose employment rights arise
out of law or contract if they could prove the termination violated the
rights established by law, 2 or violated a clear contractual right to
continued employment. The employee then would have access to the
courts or agencies of government charged with enforcement of a
*The author is an arbitrator and mediator of labor disputes. She has experience in
developing and administering grievance review procedures for nonunionized person-
nel and has arbitrated disputes involving terminations of supervisory, managerial
and professional employees. Past President of the National Academy of Arbitrators;
former Deputy Director of the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining,
formerly affiliated with the New York State Board of Mediation; member of the
United States Foreign Service Grievance Board; member of the New York Bar. LL.B.
St. John's University School of Law.
1. For an extensive discussion of the employment-at-will rule, see DeGiuseppe,
The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and
Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as De-
Giuseppe]. Commentators have proposed the adoption of various "just cause" stan-
dards to limit the employment-at-will rule, See generally Aaron, Constitutional
Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from Employment: Some Reflections in NEw
TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13 (H. Anderson ed. 1976); Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, Strangers No More:
All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 519 (1978); Howlett, Duc Process for Nonunionized Employees: A Practical
Proposal, 32 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING INDUS. RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N 64
(1980); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law.
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employ-
ees Against Unjust Discharge, 32 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING INDUS. RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASS'N 155 (1980); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dis-
missal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
2. The principle is widely accepted that both federal and state laws may be
enacted and survive a constitutional challenge even though they limit the common
law employment-at-will rule. See infra note 3 for examples of statutes.
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protecting statute. 3 Labor-management agreements, by providing for
an employer's right to discharge only for just cause,' increased the
security of employees subject to that contract and protected them
from the possibility of termination at will, without cause. If an em-
ployer violated such a contractual commitment by discharging with-
out just cause, the employee, under an arbitration clause in the agree-
ment, could seek reinstatement, with or without back pay and other
benefits. Likewise, an agreement individually entered into between
an employer and, for example, a high-level manager, for a specified
term of years, also might be violated by a discharge of that manager
during the term of the agreement, and require the payment of a sum
of money. Thus, in essence, senior managers also enjoy an exception to
at-will termination. The categories of employees who have been sub-
ject to at-will termination include those who are not included in a
union-represented bargaining unit for which a contract limits dis-
charge to just cause, 5 and those employees who are not covered by any
written contract.
The increase in support for collective bargaining, resulting from the
passage of federal and state labor laws beginning in the late 1930's6
3. Federal legislation protecting the rights of employees is extensive. See, e.g.,
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215 (a)(3), 216 (b) (1976); Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1976);
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (Supp. IV 1980); Vietnam Era
Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021 (b)(1), 2024 (c) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
4. The employment-at-will rule was modified by Congress when the labor laws
of the 1930's were enacted. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. After the unions
were established, collective bargaining agreements began to require that an employer
have a legitimate reason for terminating an employee. Unions negotiated collective
bargaining provisions which prohibited employers from discharging an employee in
the bargaining unit except for "cause." In an effort to describe the kind of "cause"
necessary to sustain termination of employment, subsequent contracts used modifiers
such as "good," "just," "reasonable" and "proper." The power to decide the issue has
been given to arbitrators. See generally C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR
RELATIONS (1972).
5. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6. The New Deal legislation of the 1930's, which dealt with unionization,
minimum wages and pensions, provided greater protection for workers. This legisla-
tion was passed in the form of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); and Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620
(codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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resulted in a substantial increase in contractual provisions for security
against discharge without just cause. Most of these contracts provide
prohibitions against discharge except for just cause. In addition, they
provide for a system of impartial determination of just cause in the
specific case. There has been utilization of the just cause test in
nonunion operations,7 where management believed it to be appropri-
ate, or where it was believed to be an effective device to avoid
unionization. Employers have found the just cause concept to be
acceptable, even if not provided by union contract, and have devel-
oped their own means of making a final and binding determination of
just cause. This has been done through either an internal hearing
system or a system employing a neutral party, and in most instances
companies that have elected to provide an unbiased determination of
just cause have established the system unilaterally.
Applying the concepts of fairness, equity and the justness of the
cause to discharges of nonunionized personnel, claims of unjust, un-
fair dismissal have been recognized in the courts as valid, whether
based on implied contract or on tort. 8 Levels of professional, supervi-
sory and managerial personnel, not previously recognized as having
job protections against unjust dismissals, have found in the courts an
opportunity to have the justness of their terminations reviewed and
decided.9 The courts, however, may not be the best forum for resolu-
tion of nonunion employment disputes because of the extensive delays
in achieving lower court decisions, the prolonged appeal procedures
and the high costs inherent in the court system. Thus, there is pres-
ently a need for the examination, development and implementation of
7. See M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 218-21
(1974) [hereinafter cited as TROTTA]. Ten years ago, Trotta reported on what ap-
peared to be a "trend toward providing some type of grievance procedure for
nonunionized employees." Id. at 218. In an informal survey, he obtained informa-
tion from 34 companies that stated that they had grievance procedures. The griev-
ance procedures fell into four categories: (1) informal open-door policies; (2) policy
statements in employee handbooks which allow employees to present their individual
complaints to supervisors and ultimately to the General Manager; (3) formalized
grievance procedures which involve a number of defined steps prior to being pre-
sented to the General Manager for final resolution; and (4) grievance procedures
which end in binding third-party arbitration. Id. Some of the companies he inter-
viewed which have these grievance procedures are TWA, Northrup Corp., Ohio
Power & Light Co., Kodak, General Mills, Pekin-Elmer and Harris Intertype. Id.
8. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 23 n.101.
9. This Article will not review the caselaw and stated rationale in the significant
decisions because it has been extensively written on and is beyond the scope of this
Article. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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alternative solutions to nonunion termination problems at the work-
place.
This Article reviews the concept of just cause as a test for termina-
tion of employment and its applicability to the nonunion workforce. 10
It addresses the feasibility of applying dispute resolution mechanisms
found workable in labor-management relations uinder union contracts
to employment-at-will disputes. 11 It further outlines the standards and
criteria utilized in the arbitration process and recognizes some prob-
lems of proof,' 2 evidence,' 3 remedy 14 and procedure that will arise
from the application of alternative methods of resolution to nonunion
disputes. Finally, this Article identifies a substantial number of issues
that need to be resolved if arbitration of just cause for termination of
nonunionized personnel is to be successful.' 5
II. Just Cause as a Test for Termination
The just cause concept as the test for termination of employment
developed in the unionized sector and in a small number of nonun-
ionized employer-employee relationships. ' 6 It rests on equity and pro-
tects the employee from being dischargeable at will. The employer is
not obligated to retain an employee who is not fulfilling the require-
ments of the job or who engaged in improper or prohibited behavior.
Thus, the once unquestioned right of management to hire or termi-
nate employment at will has changed, if the labor contract so pro-
vides, to the employer's obligation not to discharge an employee un-
justly.
Nonunion operations that accepted the concept of just cause for
white collar or blue collar employees have adopted varying proce-
dures. Some employers adopted the union contract type of procedure
and had the decision of just cause determined by an impartial third
person.17 In other situations, the president of a company, or its person-
nel director, became the last decision-making step of the procedure.
10. See infra text accompanying note 16.
11. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
15. See in fra text accompanying note 72.
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17. In selecting the impartial third person, some employers use either The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS).
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The effectiveness of the system used depended on the employees'
confidence in the system's impartiality. The recognition of just cause
as a requirement for the discharge of an employee, whether it arose
because of union recognition as a bargaining agent and the negotia-
tions that followed,' 8 or because of the employer's perception that it
was required to apply such a test to termination, frequently was used
as a recruiting device, offering to employees the application of equity
and the discouragement of favoritism, cronyism, discrimination or
other such practices.
There were employers, managers and supervisors who did not em-
brace the concept of just cause. The concepts of employment-at-will
and termination-at-will were deeply engrained and the development
of alternative approaches to termination problems at the workplace
were resisted. 9 Complaints about labor contracts turned on the catch-
phrase "but with a union contract, you can't fire anyone," meaning
that, for the union group, management had given up its right to
terminate at will and had agreed, perhaps unwillingly, to a contrac-
tual provision substituting a requirement for just cause in place of the
at-will concept.
III. The Nonunion Workforce
There were exceptions to the coverage of just cause protections,
such as (1) supervisors20 or other employees who were not included in
bargaining units, (2) management and professional personnel who did
not have collective bargaining status, (3) covered employees2' who
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20. Section 14 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (a) (1976), provides in part:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor
from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no
employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals
defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law,
either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
21. Section 2 (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1976) provides that
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual having the
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed by an
FOR DHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
were not represented, and (4) those who were not covered by specifi-
cally stated contractual protections. It was not customary to think in
terms of job rights for management and the higher levels of supervi-
sion, but, rather, in terms of the right of an employer to hire or
terminate at will. Thus, unless an individual contract between an
employer and an employee provided job security protections or a
means of ending a relationship that had become unhappy, job protec-
tions were not considered, sought or provided.
The large group of employees who were neither managerial, profes-
sional or supervisory nor in bargaining units, also were considered to
be employed at-will. For example, the policies of employer organiza-
tions that would not permit women to hold jobs after they married or
imposed age limits for employees who met the public, such as recep-
tionists and secretaries, were widespread. Terminations at will also
occurred when a new manager or supervisor came into a department.
Terminations unrelated to the quality of an individual's skills, per-
formance, preparation, qualifications, and promotability were not
unusual. Dismissals were usually not explained as the result of the
individual employee's failings; they were at-will and did not need to
be explained. An important factor affecting covered employees was
the concern of some managements that the excessive utilization of
discharge might produce union representation. That inhibition was
not present, however, for managerial, professional or higher levels of
supervisory employees.
The development of review procedures for nonunion personnel 22
and sometimes for first-line supervisory personnel was aimed at allay-
ing the discontent of employees who knew they were subject to termi-
nation at will. These procedures served a useful purpose in translating
the just cause concept of labor agreements into the relationships with
nonunion covered employees, and with noncovered supervisory, tech-
nical, professional, and managerial personnel. Thus, a right of termi-
nation remained, but where a review procedure existed, it became a
part of the employer-employee relationship with the right to termi-
nate limited only by a just cause requirement. This could be reviewed
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)],
as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
See also Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (e) (1976)
("employee" includes any individual employed by an employer except for any em-
ployee who is an immediate family member engaged in agriculture).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XII
ARBITRATING UNFAIR DISMISSALS
at some level in management in a unilaterally developed grievance
process, with the final step either an internal one 23 or an impartial
one,24 using an arbitrator selected from a panel obtained from one of
the designating agencies.
Nonunion review procedures generally have not been effective rem-
edies for managerial or upper levels of supervisory, technical, or
professional employees. Where such an employee has been termi-
nated, he or she has relied on the courts for redress of claimed discrim-
ination, 25 improper termination, and claimed violation of a contrac-
tual right or tort. For example, personnel booklets, 26 which review
employer personnel policies and practices, health and pension plans,
and give employees other information which they might need to
function, became recruitment tools for all employee levels, except for
top officers and top level management. Some of these booklets have
been found to contain "words of promise" in describing pension, sick
23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The record of internal grievance
procedure systems established voluntarily by employers does not prove that nonunion
employees will be completely protected from at-will dismissal. First, only a handful
of employers have adopted voluntary arbitration for nonunion employees. Address
by Prof. Stieber, Proceedings Ann. Meeting Indus. Relations Research Ass'n Annual
Meeting (Dec. 29, 1983), reprinted in Daily Lab. Reptr., No. 2, D-4 (Jan. 5, 1984).
Second, one study has indicated that nonunion complaint systems enjoy little credi-
bility among employees and that terminations are rarely appealed through such
systems. CONFERENCE BOARD, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS: A CORPORATE AP-
PRAISAL (1980); Policies for Unorganized Employees PPF Survey No. 125 (BNA)
(April 1979).
24. The American Arbitration Association and progressive employer representa-
tives have supported voluntary employer action, including impartial arbitration, for
discharged nonunion employees. See, e.g., PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES
AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE, 4-20 (J. Stieber & J. Blackburn eds. 1980); Schauer, Due
Process for Nonunionized Employees, 31 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING INDUS. RELA-
TIONS RESEARCH Ass'N 180 (1979).
25. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1940-41 (1983). A review of 92
wrongful discharge cases revealed that 84 of the cases involved plaintiffs from the
primary labor market. Id. at 1941. As one commentator has noted, "Typical job titles
of plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases are company vice-president, sales manager,
marketing director, foreman, physician, sales representative, pharmacist, depart-
ment manager, etc." Address by Prof. Stieber, Proceedings Ann. Meeting Indus.
Relations Research Ass'n (Dec. 29, 1983), supra note 23, at D-3.
26. See, e.g., Community Serv. Soc'y of N.Y., Personnel Practices Manual (Oct.
1975); Hirschfeld, Stern, Moyer & Ross, Inc., Personnel Guide (undated); New York
Magazine, Personnel Policy Manual (Jan. 1977); Economic Opportunity Council of
Suffolk, Inc., Personnel Policy & Procedures (Apr. 1973); Planned Parenthood of
New York City, Inc., Personnel Manual (June 1981). The booklets are available from
their respective organizations.
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leave and other plans in which length of service has a relationship to
the amount of benefit. 27 They appeared, to some, to be a commitment
of continuing employment 28 unless just cause for termination could be
shown. Court decisions in lawsuits claiming violations of contractual
rights in a termination of employment which relied on the implied
contractual commitment contained in the booklets have produced
revisions in the language of booklets29 and statements of the right to
discharge at will. But recruitment of new employees, particularly for
the technical, professional and managerial groups, may suffer as a
result of the expressed reservation to dismiss at will.
Except as provided in collective bargaining agreements,30 in indi-
vidual employer-employee contracts of employment, or in specially
devised review procedures for covered or noncovered employees, 31
termination at will, until recently, remained an employer's right,
whether or not there was a showing of just cause. In recent years,
employees have sought redress in the courts for a claimed contract
violation or a tortious act.3 2 These nonunion employees successfully
have pursued claims of unjust dismissal and have been awarded sub-
stantial compensatory and punitive damages on implied contract,
tort, discrimination or other statutory violation theories.33
IV. Labor Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Court awards of damages for unjust dismissal for executive and
managerial personnel or for technical or professional employees have
27. Generally, a personnel booklet will not be treated as an employment, con-
tract, unless a mutuality of obligation can be demonstrated. See, e.g., Shaw v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 7, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (1975); Johnson v. National
Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976); Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1978), affd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979).
28. See, e.g., Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (company personnel policy providing that employee could
not be discharged except for cause may become part of employment contract by
either express written or oral agreement or employee's "legitimate expectations"). But
cf. Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (dis-
charged employee did not have right to "just cause" determination where employ-
ment application signed by employee stated that employment was at will).
29. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 45.
30. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 7, 23 & 24 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 24-34.
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been substantial 34 and warrant a comparison with the grievance pro-
cedure remedies that result in arbitration. Grievance claims under
union contracts heard by arbitrators generally seek reinstatement with
full back pay, seniority and benefits. 35 But the remedy for contract
violation or tort in the courts has been money damages rather than
reinstatement. Moreover, there are problems with the court system
that are not inherent in the arbitration process, such as extensive
delays in achieving lower court decisions, the time-consuming appeal
procedures36 and the high costs incurred. Because of these deficiencies
in court processes, interest has been expressed in applying existing
labor dispute resolution mechanisms found workable in labor-man-
agement relations under union contracts to employment-at-will dis-
putes.
A. Labor Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Using Third Party
Neutrals
Three dispute resolution mechanisms have potential for use in em-
ployment-at-will cases. The first mechanism is mediation, which has
been significantly used in achieving labor peace in the negotiation of
labor contracts. It has not achieved similar results in the mediation of
grievance disputes arising during the term of the labor contract per-
haps because, unless it is clear that a contract does exist, or that there
has been a termination in which just cause is in dispute, mediation
cannot be expected to achieve more than a nuisance settlement on
both sides. 37 Furthermore, mediators have no power except the ability
to make public disclosure of the intransigence of either party, or both,
which is a questionable practice.3" Therefore, it is unlikely in the
present stage of termination-at-will postures that the differences
among the courts and among lawyers can be accommodated and
reasonable results obtained through the use of mediation.
34. Id.
35. For a discussion of the remedies, see M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN
ARBITRATION, 40-96 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HILL & SINICROPI].
36. For example, money damages that are awarded five years after an individual
is discharged unjustly at age sixty may have little value.
37. A few practitioners believe that mediation has promise, but evidence sup-
porting this claim is unsubstantiated. But cf. Development of the Law of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities in the Work Place, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L., at
45-47 (committee advocates mediation similar to that used in The Coal Industry
Mediation Project and The Fair Workplace Program).
38. See E. ROBINS, A GUIDE For LABOR MEDIATORS (Univ. of Hawaii Press No.
22, Jan. 1976).
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The second mechanism is fact-finding with recommendations. In
this process a neutral person conducts a hearing, obtains as much
evidence and testimony as the parties are willing to furnish, perhaps
attempts mediation, and makes findings and recommendations which
the parties are free to accept, reject or use as a basis for further
negotiations.39 Although fact-finding with recommendations has been
used in public sector labor relations and has been an effective tool in
contract negotiations, it has not been used in public sector grievance
disputes. Because there is a fundamental question regarding the exis-
tence of an agreement of employment and the limitation of termina-
tion to instances of shown cause in employment-at-will disputes, it is
reasonable to doubt that fact-finding with recommendations could be
a useful dispute resolution activity in these cases.
The third mechanism is grievance arbitration. In labor-manage-
ment contracts, grievance procedures are provided as the system of
private jurisprudence,40 generally with the employment of a neutral
arbitrator as the final step of the grievance procedure. Aribtrators are
selected by the parties from lists supplied in accordance with their
agreement by a designating agency 4' or through whatever method
they find acceptable. While procedural and jurisdictional issues, as
well as questions of rights, would have to be determined before a
system of arbitration could be engaged, those requirements are not
impossible to fulfill. In the arbitration process, absent provisions to
the contrary, a final and binding decision is made that is not subject to
appeal except in extraordinary circumstances of error or of the arbi-
trator exceeding his jurisdiction.42 It results in an award and an
opinion which respond to the question submitted to the arbitrator.
Grievance arbitration, developed under labor contracts, attempts
to avoid overburdening the process with pre-hearing jockeying for
position. Thus, recognizing the need for speed in moving from an
action, to a grievance, to a hearing, to the decision of the arbitrator,
parties utilizing arbitration have avoided the time-consuming and
delaying discovery process. They have preferred to use a grievance
procedure developed by them to meet their own needs. This is not
39. See TROTTA, supra note 7, at 24-25.
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. See TROTTA, supra note 7, at 55-62.
42. Arbitrators' authority was strengthened in 1960 by the Supreme Court in the
Steelworkers Triology cases. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
[Vol. XII
ARBITRATING UNFAIR DISMISSALS
always successful, but for employers and unions who opt for develop-
ment of a workable relationship between themselves, 43 a well-handled
grievance procedure neither "gives away the shop" nor insists, forever,
on its own interest to the exclusion of all others.
Grievance procedures generally have been successful in labor-man-
agement relations in the private sector. Advocates trained in litigation
and lacking knowledge of collective bargaining, contract administra-
tion and the responsibility of each party for contributing to the rela-
tionship between the parties sometimes seek to bring into the arbitra-
tion process aspects of litigation, such as the discovery process. Parties
experienced with collective bargaining, however, recognize the obli-
gation to continue to treat arbitration as a private system, without
obligation to emulate court processes. 44 Thus, while some effort has
been made by practitioners to introduce aspects of the judicial process
into arbitration, the resistance of employers, unions and arbitrators
has been steady and largely successful.
Neither mediation nor fact-finding with recommendations, at this
stage of the at-will processes, appears to be the most appropriate
dispute resolution mechanism for the nonunion workforce. Therefore,
arbitration may be the only process able to function as the dispute
resolution mechanism in at-will cases. The willingness of employers,
individual employees or groups of employees to utilize a process that
generally has been successful in the resolution of disputes for union-
ized personnel is unclear. Further discussion and analysis of the arbi-
tration process is needed to present a clear understanding of its possi-
bilities.
B. The Arbitration Process
In arbitration, arbitrators and the parties are involved in deciding if
a discharge was just and proper considering the circumstances
43. Approximately 96% of all collective bargaining agreements contain proce-
dures for the settlement of disputes through mutual discussion and arbitration. The
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) reports that grievance procedures were found in
99 % of the contracts sampled in a recent study. In addition, arbitration is called for
in 96% of the sample contracts, 98% in manufacturing and 94% in nonmanufac-
turing. BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 6 (1979).
44. In the author's experience, this is less true in the public sector, where arbitra-
bility disputes abound, and this acts as a detriment in the arbitration process.
Moreover, in the federal sector, the subjects of bargaining are limited, union and
employer representation skills are not comparable with the private sector, and the
grievance process is overly technical. The author believes that the parties involved
1984]
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present. Arbitrators are asked to evaluate the severity of an offense, to
consider the full circumstances of the triggering incident that pre-
ceded the termination, to determine if the judgment of the employer's
supervisory or managerial people was sound, and to decide if dis-
charge was the appropriate remedy for the offense. To regulate the
arbitration process, parties have developed generalized criteria and
standards4 5 to determine when just cause for the termination of an
employee's employment has been shown. These criteria and standards
have been examined by arbitrators who have refined them and added
others. 46 As needs and special cases arose, unions and employers have
added to and modified the criteria and standards.
Arbitrators seeking to determine the existence of cause in a particu-
lar case and to evaluate that cause must judge the quality of a wit-
ness's credibility and recollections. 47 They receive information pro-
vided by the parties, but they may ask for additional information. In
essence, the parties submit to a neutral third party the judgments they
have been unable or unwilling to make for themselves in order to
resolve a dispute.
In a particular case, an arbitrator may be obliged to consider
criteria and standards recognized and examined by other arbitrators
in determining just cause, although not precisely in the labor con-
tract. 48 Mere assertion is not sufficient to persuade arbitrators that just
have not learned to move away from sparring and toward development of the skills
of labor relations and dispute resolution.
45. However, as TROTTA, supra note 7, explains, "Unfortunately, no standards
exist for defining "just cause" . . . . Although arbitrators apply commonly accepted
industrial and community standards, through their decisions they have collectively
influenced the concept of what constitutes just cause." Id. at 236.
46. Id. at 237.
47. Id. at 101. In a paper delivered before the National Academy of Arbitrators,
Edgar A. Jones cautioned that
anyone driven by necessity of decision to fret about credibilty, who has
listened over a number of years to sworn testimony, knows that as much
truth must have been uttered by shifty-eyed, perspiring, lip-licking, nail
biting, guilty-looking, ill at ease, fidgety witnesses as have lies issued from
calm, collected, imperturbable, urbane, straight-in-the-eve perjuries.
Jones, Problems of Proof in the Arbitration Process, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19Ti AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 208 (1966).
48. Although the following list is extensive, it is not exclusive. The criteria and
standards examined by arbitrators include:
1. The "law of the shop," which covers offenses that traditionally have been treated
as grounds for discharge. In addition, the employer must have consistently described
the offenses as severe.
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cause does or does not exist. The arbitrator asks for evidence 49 to
support the claims asserted. Rules and regulations applied occasion-
ally and with varying emphasis ° do not support termination based on
a claim of violation of those rules and regulations. In multi-plant
operations under the same union contract, the varying attitudes of a
large number of supervisors results in making a rule less than abso-
lutely enforceable. Generally, the arbitrator considers the facts of the
particular case, plant considerations, the probable effect on the plant
2. The pattern of consistent enforcement of rules and regulations which were made
known to all employees.
3. The case histories in the same company and/or plant which demonstrate that the
rules and regulations were enforced.
4. Whether the offense warrants immediate suspension of the employee or whether
an investigation and meetings with the union should precede suspension.
5. The pattern of severe discipline for certain offenses to ensure safe working
conditions. For example, smoking in a prohibited area in a paint factory. physical
threat to fellow employees, supervisors or customers, theft and similar offenses.
6. The offenses involving serious criminal action, even if they occur off-premises,
because of the effect public knowledge might have on an employer, employees or the
union.
7. The length and quality of employee's service.
8. Whether the offense that triggered the termination occurred; whether it was as
serious as it is maintained to have been.
9. Whether the employee had been warned on prior occasions for a similar offense.
10. Whether there are extenuating circumstances. Was the employee provoked into
adverse behavior?
11. Whether there are grounds for mitigating the penalty.
12. The general "arbitral authority" as it is derived from publications of awards,
articles, and speeches.
13. The arbitrator's sense of equity and his subjective judgment of the seriousness of
the incident involved, the record and the circumstances which led to the discharge.
14. The basic test, recognized by many arbitrators, is whether the employee can be
relied upon to meet the normal requirements of the job. For example, discipline cases
which involve extended and repetitive absences from the job, drug and alcohol abuse
cases.
15. Whether another chance is warranted? This requires a judgment the arbitrator
believes, from the evidence, that the employee who is responsible for the offense has
learned a lesson and will not repeat the offense.
49. See infra notes 44 & 47 and accompanying text.
50. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 643 (3d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as ELKOURI & ELKOURI]. "Arbitrators have not hesitated to disturb
penalties, assessed without clear and timely warning, where the employer over a
period of time had condoned the violation of the rule in the past-lax enforcement of
rules may lead employees reasonably to believe that the conduct in question is
sanctioned by management." Id.
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and on supervision if the discharge is sustained or reversed, and the
probable effect on the union. The arbitrator considers the customary
procedures in that plant under the applicable contract language in
similar instances, and considers if the discipline in that case is consist-
ent with the discipline usually given for similar offenses.
Although the arbitrator will not apply his or her "own brand of
industrial justice,"'5 it is a fallacy to imply that the arbitrator does not
bring to each case his own experience of what is or is not equitable or
just under the circumstances of that case. "Arbitral judgment is not
excluded or sacrificed because of the effort to avoid dispensing one's
own brand of industrial justice."5 2 When the parties ask for a decision
on the cause for discharge there is substantial room for the exercise of
arbitral judgment.
The difference among the various terms used by unions and em-
ployers to describe the kind of "cause" they agreed on has become
blurred and the words frequently are used interchangeably. But
where there is evidence of negotiating significance in the selection of
the term used, arbitrators will attempt to apply the parties' meaning.
Thus, if the contract language historically provided for "just cause" as
the limitation for discharge, but in the recent negotiation the parties
agreed to change that to "reasonable cause," most arbitrators will seek
information from the parties concerning who sought the change and
the parties' understandings of the significance of the change.
C. Burden of Proof and Evidence Requirements in Labor
Arbitration
Arbitration differs significantly from the court system, and if there
is to be arbitration of at-will dismissal cases, the differences concern-
ing who has the burden of proof 53 and which type of evidence 54
51. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
52. Presidential Address by Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Proceedings of the 35th Annual
Meeting of the Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators (J. Stern & B. Daniels eds. 1982).
53. A review of published decisions indicates that the burden of proof may
depend upon the nature of the issue, the specific contract provision, or a usage
established by the parties. See, e.g., St. Joseph Lead Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 781
(1957) (Bothwell, Arb.); Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 525 (1957)
(Cahn, Arb.); Ingersoll Prods. Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 882
(1967) (Larkin, Arb.). See also HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 34, at 13; ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 50, at 277-78.
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reaches the decision-maker need to be resolved. In the arbitration of
discharge cases, it is generally accepted that the burden of proof rests
on the employer,5 5 to demonstrate that the discharge was for just
cause. There is a minority, however, that does not believe that a true
burden of proof exists in arbitration. This minority56 contends that, in
discharge cases, the employer who frequently has greater access to the
facts, has an obligation to proceed first at a hearing. He must produce
(1) evidence as to the basis upon which a discharge was effectuated;
(2) what the facts and circumstances were; (3) why the employer
decided to discharge rather than to assess a lesser discipline; (4) why
some discipline is warranted; and (5) why the employer believes the
arbitrator should sustain the employer's position that discharge is the
appropriate discipline. It is then the burden of the union to present its
argument regarding the significance of the incident and the factual
dispute as well as its argument concerning the inappropriateness of
54. See HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 34, at 4-6; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note
50, at 257-58.
In discharge or discipline cases the most important evidence generally
comes in the form of testimony of witnesses, the facts which led to the
disciplinary action being of great importance. If, however, there is not
disagreement as to these facts and if the primary issue is one concerning
proper punishment, then the past record of the employee and evidence of
past disciplinary action taken in similar cases enter the picture in a major
capacity.
Id. at 257.
55. See Gorske, Burden of Proof in Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 135,
156 (1959); Report of the Pittsburgh Tripartite, Problems of Proof in Arbitration,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
257 (1967).
56. In a recent address to the National Academy of Arbitrators, Edgar A. Jones,
Jr. offered the following thoughts on the role of burden of proof in decisional
thinking:
In this process of making up my mind, however, I have not found the
time-honored legal "burden of proof" very helpful. It is, after all, an act ofjudgment to decide that a party has not "borne the burden"; the "burden"
formula, therefore, is only one of inquiry, not conclusion. I have no
quarrel with a trier who finds it a decisionally helpful thinking aid; it is
important to be aware, however, that the formula has at least the poten-
tial of obscuring the actual mental process of deciding to the "yes" or the
"no" to the claimant.
Jones, An Effort to Describe One Person's Decisional Thinking, in DECISIONAL
THINKING OF LABOR ARBITRATORS AND FEDERAL JUDGES AS TRiERS OF FACT: SELECTED
DISCUSSION MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 164-65 (1980).
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discharge. Whether this constitutes a burden of proof on the employer
or not, it is clear that arbitrators expect the employer to come forward
first and show why the employee was terminated and why termina-
tion should be sustained, with the union then presenting its evidence
and argument.
It is also important to note that the rules of evidence applicable in
the courtroom do not apply to the arbitration hearing. 57 Nevertheless,
arbitrators generally do control the presentation of a case at a hearing.
This is not because "anything goes" but because the arbitrator desires
to have the maximum available information to make a judgment.
Arbitration is a private system developed by employers, unions and
arbitrators to serve the useful purpose of resolving labor disputes at
the workplace in an expeditious manner, using arbitrators who have a
knowledge of collective bargaining and labor relations. Arbitrators
are careful to avoid giving weight to questionable evidence and testi-
mony, but evidence that does not have much relevancy might never-
theless be introduced and received in evidence, frequently without
opposition, because the parties want the arbitrator to have as much
information as possible before reaching a decision.
D. Remedies in Labor Arbitration
Remedies in court procedures differ substantially from those in the
arbitration process. Generally, the remedy in arbitration is reinstate-
ment 58 with monetary damages of back pay, 59 seniority and benefits.
The remedy in court includes monetary damages both for back pay
and for the future probable working years of a wrongfully discharged
employee, but not reinstatement. Damages for the future probable
working years of a wrongfully discharged employee are unusual in
arbitration because of the practice of reinstatement.
57. See, e.g., Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United States Steelworkers, 64
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2580, 2581 (C.D. Cal. 1967) ("[i]t is well established that rules of
evidence as applied in court proceedings do not prevail in arbitration hearings").
This has been the rule under the common law. See cases cited in 6 C.J.S. Arbitration
§ 85 n.96 (1975).
58. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). The Court
stated that, "[w]ithout such a remedy [reinstatement] industrial peace might be
endangered because workers would be resentful of their inability to return to jobs to
which they may have been attached and from which they were wrongfully dis-
charged." Id. at 443.
59. For a discussion of the complexities that exist in formulating backpav awards
in discharge and disciplinary cases, see HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 34, at 54-91.
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If arbitration of just cause for termination of nonunionized person-
nel is adopted, standards will be required for awarding compensatory
and punitive damages, attorney fees or interest, which are customar-
ily awarded in court proceedings for contract or tort claims. Whether
the remedy of reinstatement with full back pay is suitable in cases of
executive removal later determined not to have been for just cause, or
whether the monetary award of the courts would be more useful and
realistic is an unsettled issue. Because remedies in the courts are more
extensive than those customarily found in arbitration, parties opting
for arbitration as a means of resolving a dispute regarding the just
cause for the termination of a managerial or nonorganized employee
must decide how much authority is to be given to the arbitrator in
determining the remedy.
V. Translation of Concepts of Just Cause to the Nonunion Situation
Arbitration of employer-employee disputes has not been limited to
unionized employees. It has been utilized in nonunionized operations
in which employers wanted to furnish employees an opportunity for
review of the circumstances of their discharge and a neutral examina-
tion of just cause as applied to that case. 0 It also has been used by an
employer where some covered employees are represented by unions,
but other covered employees, in other units or plants of the same
company, have not opted for representation."'
In such situations, the criteria recognized by the employers and
made known to the arbitrators generally are the same for the nonun-
ion group as they would have been for a union group. There will have
been a calculated decision that the policies and procedures applicable
to the union groups would be applied in exactly the same fashion to
the nonunion group. The nonunion group, however, does not have
union presence and representation, union contract provisions or union
memory of past cases. It is different because the employee either
represents himself, finds a representative from among employer offi-
cials (if permitted) or retains an attorney. Although the individual
would pay counsel expenses, the full bill of the arbitrator would be
paid by the employer. This is a source of some disquiet to most
60. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
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arbitrators who prefer to have the bill divided equally between both
sides in an arbitration case.
There are numerous problems raised by the possibility of substitut-
ing a dispute resolution system, borrowed primarily from the union-
ized sector, for court proceedings in the nonunion field. Arbitration
originally developed because of the need for a hearing and decision-
making function without prolonged delays or excessive costs. Arbitra-
tion involves remedies which are not customarily utilized by the
courts,6 2 and it follows procedures and concepts not found in court
processes. But, as demonstrated, where arbitration is an adopted
system for employment disputes in nonunionized units, these differ-
ences have not precluded the use of arbitration. 63 On the contrary,
they have produced more careful development of solutions to the
problems raised.
The just cause concept of termination discussed above was unique
to the unionized situation for many years. The criteria and standards
applicable to just cause discharge,"4 and recognized by arbitrators,
refer to the contractual commitment made by an employer to limit his
right of discharge to just cause only. There are five groups within an
employer organization who could be protected by just cause limita-
tion or discharge: (1) covered employees65 (white collar, blue collar,
technical, professional) unionized and subject to a union contract; (2)
covered employees6 6 (white collar, blue collar, professional, technical)
not unionized but subject to uniform, general policy and benefits; (3)
foremen or lower level supervisors," not unionized; (4) middle man-
agement, professionals and department heads, not unionized; and (5)
top levels of management and executive officers.
Initially, only persons in group one were given the job protection of
the just cause limitation on discharge. Subsequently, through specific
programs unilaterally adopted by some employers, nonunionized em-
ployees in covered levels, group two, were given the job protections of
just cause limitations and the right of review, sometimes by a neutral
arbitrator.6 8 But these were a very small percentage of the numerous
62. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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employees in this second group. Depending on the wording of person-
nel booklets or other documents of employment, persons in groups
two, three and sometimes four, recently have been held to have
implied promises of continuity of employment unless just cause were
shown for termination. 9 In addition, regardless of handbooks, there
have been indications, in some states or districts, of judicially recog-
nized protections against unfairness for employees at all levels, with-
out a contractual or statutory guarantee of fair treatment. 70
Whether charges are based on a contractual claim, claims of age
discrimination, or claims of inequity and unfairness, the concept of
termination at-will has taken a severe blow in many states or districts,
with courts awarding high compensatory and punitive damages.7 '
Employers have not been satisfied with this result.
If parties opt for arbitration to determine the existence of just cause
for the termination of nonunionized personnel, the following issues
need to be addressed: 7
2
1. Will arbitration continue to be a process largely defined by the
parties and the arbitrator or will there be a concerted effort to enact a
uniform arbitration law?
2. Will the less formal process prevalent in labor arbitration (and
even in commercial arbitration) be replaced by the more formal
processes carried over from the courts? For example, will discovery,
transcripts, and briefs become part of the process?
3. Will the arbitration process continue to be final and binding,
without appeal on the merits?
4. Will court concepts of plaintiff's burden of proof cause changes
in the generally recognized arbitration practices?
5. What will be the sources and limitations of the arbitrator's
authority? Without a collective bargaining agreement, will the parties
be expected to enter into an agreement to arbitrate? Will arbitration
continue to be a voluntary process?
69. See supra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 1 & 5 and accompanying text.
71. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 23-34.
72. Based on the experience of the author as an arbitrator, these are the most
relevant issues that need to be examined.
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6. What will substitute for a grievance procedure to allow the
parties to exchange information about their positions before the arbi-
tration hearing?
7. Will the criteria and standards for measurement of just cause
be the same for nonunion personnel, up to and including manage-
ment, as they are for union represented personnel under a labor
contract? Will the standards be the same, for example, for a vice
president terminated at-will because he was approaching retirement,
and therefore pensionable, as for a clerk? How does one determine the
criteria applied in the past, if any?
8. Are concepts of corrective, progressive discipline as applicable
to middle management as they are to a plant employee? How are
standards dealing with drug and alcohol use, or abuse, to be applied
to an officer of a company, to a first line supervisor or to a truck
driver?
9. Is the standard for off-premises behavior the same for a super-
visor as it is for one of the employees supervised? Is there a more
demanding standard for restraint and exemplary conduct from a su-
pervisor than from the employee supervised?
10. Will a different set of behavior standards be developed for
executive management as contrasted to a supervisor of a department?
11. Will the standards and criteria be developed through case
experience in arbitration on an employer-by-employer basis, or
through court decisions under a statute, which have precedential
value?
VI. Conclusion
There is presently a concern with the survival of the right of em-
ployers to discharge employees not specifically protected by a contrac-
tual just cause limitation. No dispute exists that an employer's right to
terminate an employee for inadequate performance, improper behav-
ior or other failures will continue, assuming just cause under those
circumstances can be proved. But the freedom exercised by manage-
ments to discharge regardless of the absence of cause, without obliga-
tion to make a persuasive showing of cause has been severely circum-
scribed in some jurisdictions. The unquestioned right to terminate
may be lost even in the jurisdictions 'that have been unwilling to
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recognize contractual rights as existing through employee manuals
and other such documents.
If the principle of just cause is extended from the labor contracts to
the nonorganized levels, and to supervisory, professional and manage-
rial levels, employment-at-will concepts may survive only for the
executive, policy-making levels of an enterprise. If lawsuits involving
employment-at-will discharges continue to increase, there will be
problems in processing such suits in the court system because of the
extensive delays and expenses inherent in court procedures and the
burdensome cost of appeal procedures. 73 These limitations place per-
sons claiming unjust treatment at a vast disadvantage.
Dispute resolution mechanisms which have been effective in labor-
management relationships74 may need to be developed to resolve the
increasing number of cases involving discrimination in termination of
employment, at-will discharge without cause and similar situations.
Whether just cause for termination in the nonorganized sector is to
continue to be a matter for the courts or is to be resolved through
arbitration or another dispute settlement mechanism, the differences
in the processes, concepts, standards and criteria, burden of proof,
standards of evidence and proof, remedies, and the authority of the
decision-maker will have to be accounted for and accommodated.
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 37, 39 & 40 and accompanying text.

